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The Pitfalls of Work Requirements in Welfare-to-Work Policies: 




This paper investigates whether policies that encourage recipients to exit welfare for full-time 
employment influence participation in educational activity. The Self-Sufficiency Project 
(‘SSP’) was a demonstration project where long-term welfare recipients randomly assigned to 
the treatment group were offered a generous earnings supplement if they exited welfare for 
full-time employment. We find that treatment group members were less likely to upgrade their 
education along all dimensions: high-school completion, enrolling in a community college or 
trade school, and enrolling in university. Thus, ‘work-first’; policies that encourage full-time 
employment may reduce educational activity and may have adverse consequences on the 
long-run earnings capacity of welfare recipients. We also find that there was a substantial 
amount of educational upgrading in this population. For instance, among high-school 
dropouts at the baseline, 19% completed their diploma by the end of the demonstration. 
Finally, we simulate the consequences of the earnings supplement in the absence of adverse 
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1.  Introduction 
A central issue in the design of social programs is minimizing adverse consequences. In 
structuring their welfare programs many countries have struggled with the conflicting objectives 
of providing adequate support to low-income families, encouraging work and achieving low 
government costs. Much economic research has been devoted to understanding the effects of 
program design on work incentives. Impacts on family composition and fertility have also 
received attention. Little is known, however, about the subject of this paper – the impacts of 
welfare programs on educational attainment. 
During the 1990s traditional welfare programs were substantially restructured in the U.S. and 
several other countries. A central goal of these reforms was to encourage work and economic 
self-sufficiency. Although much has been learned about the consequences of these policy 
changes, several unresolved issues remain. One contentious issue involves the choice between 
“work-first” and “human capital development” approaches to achieving self-sufficiency. The 
work-first approach -- which emphasizes moving recipients into jobs quickly, even if at low 
initial wages -- reflects the view that welfare recipients can best acquire work habits and skills at 
the workplace. In contrast, the human capital approach seeks to raise the long term earnings 
capacity of welfare recipients by providing training and educational opportunities. 
A noteworthy feature of recent welfare policies has been the emphasis on financial 
incentives. Many U.S. states have experimented with welfare-to-work programs since the early 
1980s. The replacement in 1996 of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program with 
the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families block grant gave states much more discretion in 
the design of their welfare programs. This greater authority, together with federal targets for 
work requirements, led to increased use of financial incentives. Unlike the negative income tax   2 
programs evaluated in the 1960s and 1970s, recent financial incentives often emphasize full-time 
employment (Blank, Card and Robins, 2000).  
 This paper makes three contributions. First, we contribute to the debate over alternative 
approaches to welfare reform by investigating whether policies that provide a financial incentive 
to exit welfare for full-time work influence participation in educational activity. As noted by 
Moffitt (2002), the effects of transfer programs on human capital investment have received little 
attention.
1
The second contribution of this study is to advancing our understanding of the factors that 
influence the behavior of welfare recipients. Most economic analysis of income support policies 
employs a static choice framework.
 By raising the return to existing skills, such policies may reduce the incentive to 
invest in additional education. In addition, by encouraging full-time participation in the 
workforce they reduce the time available for other activities, including acquiring further 
education. Earnings supplements that are conditional on full-time employment may thus 
inadvertently reduce the long run earnings capacity of welfare recipients. Our investigation 
provides rather striking evidence that this may indeed be the case.  
2
                                                 
1 The principal exception is Miller and Saunders (1997) who examine the impact of state-level generosity of welfare 
on high school completion. Kesselman (1976) makes the point that, for those expecting to remain on public 
assistance, welfare reduces the incentive to invest in education.   
2 See Moffitt (2002) for a survey of the literature on welfare programs and labor supply. 
 Central to this workhorse model is the way that alternative 
policies alter the budget constraint faced by current and potential program participants. Our 
analysis highlights two aspects of behavior that standard models often abstract from. One is the 
time constraint. Raising young children and upgrading one’s formal schooling are activities that 
compete with market work for available time. The second is forward-looking behavior, a feature 
emphasized by Miller and Saunders (1997), Keane and Wolpin (2002) and others. In our setting, 
investing in additional education involves incurring time and financial costs today in return for   3 
expected future benefits. Our results indicate that taking into account the longer-term 
consequences of current decisions is important to understanding the behavior of welfare 
recipients.          
To address these issues we employ data from the Self-Sufficiency Project (SSP), a 
demonstration project designed to provide a rigorous test of a temporary earnings supplement. 
The SSP was carried out in the Canadian provinces of British Columbia and New Brunswick 
during the 1990s and was evaluated using a random assignment design. The treatment involved a 
generous earnings supplement for those leaving welfare to take full-time employment. 
The paper’s final contribution is to enhancing our understanding of the lessons from the SSP 
demonstration itself. A central objective of the experiment was to test the theory that a temporary 
earnings supplement could have long-term impacts on employment, earnings and welfare receipt. 
By providing recipients with a strong financial incentive to exit welfare and take up full-time 
work, treatment group members would gain additional work experience, potentially leading to 
higher wages and improved employment opportunities. Preferences between work and non-work 
activities might also be altered by increased exposure to the workplace. As a consequence, work 
could become a better alternative to welfare after the end of the earnings supplement.  
The results of the SSP demonstration have led many observers to conclude that temporary 
earnings supplements are unlikely to have long-lasting impacts. Although the financial incentive 
offer did result in a large decline in welfare receipt and a substantial increase in employment 
during the supplement period, by the end of the SSP demonstration there were no significant 
differences between treatments and controls in employment or welfare receipt (Michalopoulos et. 
al 2002). However, our results suggest that providing a financial incentive for full-time 
employment can have both positive and negative effects on human capital accumulation of   4 
welfare recipients. The former arise from additional work experience, and the negative impacts 
arise from reduced investment in formal education. Whether the overall impact is positive or 
negative depends on the magnitudes of these offsetting effects. This radically different 
interpretation of the lessons from the SSP follows from the unintended consequences on 
educational upgrading of providing incentives to work full-time.   
Our examination of SSP data indicates that increases in educational attainment among 
current and former welfare recipients are quantitatively important. Based on our preferred 
sample, about 19% of those who were high school dropouts at the time of the baseline survey 
had completed secondary school by the 54-month survey. Among those who had graduated from 
high school at the baseline, substantial educational activity is also evident in the form of 
enrolment in community colleges and universities. The extent of educational upgrading suggests 
that this is a phenomenon worthy of investigation. 
A key finding of the paper is that the offer of a financial incentive to exit welfare and take 
full-time employment reduced educational upgrading among SSP participants. The impact of the 
supplement offer on educational activity was largest in the first 18 months after random 
assignment, when the difference in full-time employment between the treatment and control 
groups was the largest. We conclude that encouraging full-time employment has potentially 
adverse consequences for the long-term earnings capacity of single parents on welfare.  
Another conclusion is that the SSP experimental impacts may have caused observers to reach 
incorrect conclusions about the long-term effects of temporary earnings supplements, and the 
mechanisms by which such effects occur. Those who upgraded their formal education achieved 
gains in employment and reductions in welfare receipt relative to their counterparts who did not 
acquire additional education. The gains experienced by “upgraders” appear to be principally a   5 
consequence of their investments in education rather than being due to unobserved factors that 
are correlated with both the propensity to acquire education and individual outcomes. We 
simulate the impacts of the SSP financial incentive on welfare receipt in the absence of any 
impact on educational upgrading. Our simulation results suggest that in these circumstances the 
temporary earnings supplement would have long-lasting effects. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides background on the SSP 
demonstration. Section 3 outlines a simple economic model that motivates the empirical analysis 
and helps to interpret the results. The fourth section describes the data used in our investigation. 
Section 5 analyses the impact of the SSP financial offer on educational upgrading, utilizing the 
random assignment feature of the research design. Particular focus is given to high school 
completion among secondary school dropouts and university enrolment among high school 
graduates. This part of the analysis examines whether full-time work requirements reduce the 
amount of formal educational upgrading that would have otherwise occurred. Section 6 examines 
the extent to which our empirical results lead to a re-assessment of the implications of the SSP 
experiment. The final section concludes. 
2.  Background 
Alternative welfare-to-work strategies have been extensively debated. A particularly contentious 
issue is whether to encourage welfare recipients to enter the work force with their existing skills 
or to help them to acquire additional human capital. As discussed by Blank (2002), evaluations 
indicate that the work-first strategy increases earnings and reduces welfare receipt to a greater 
extent than does the human capital strategy, at least in the short run (two to three years after 
entry into the program). However, human capital strategies may be superior over longer time 
horizons. For example, using data from California’s GAIN program – a program that adopted a   6 
variety of welfare-to-work strategies – Hotz, Imbens and Klerman (2006) find that recipients 
who participated in human capital programs did as well as or better than those in work-first 
programs in years 7 to 9 after the program.  
In this paper we examine the consequences of a particular variant on the work-first strategy – 
one that provides a powerful financial incentive to obtain and maintain full-time employment. 
Our objective is not to contrast this policy with one that provides educational and training 
opportunities. Rather, we seek to understand whether welfare-to-work programs that focus on 
encouraging full-time employment may retard gains in formal education that would otherwise 
occur. To our knowledge this possibility has not been previously examined.
3
Recent welfare reforms have substantially reduced caseloads, but there is little evidence of 
increased income among former participants (Blank, 2002). One explanation for this situation is 
that many states have adopted earnings disregards that tend to encourage part-time employment 
– which is unlikely to reduce poverty. For this reason, analysts such as Robins and 
Michalopoulos (2001) have advocated financial incentives that encourage welfare leavers to 
work full-time.
  
4 The SSP is a leading example of this approach.
5
During the 1990s the Canadian government funded an innovative demonstration project, the 
SSP, designed to provide evidence on the effects of a financial incentive on long-term welfare 
recipients.
 
6 The SSP focused on single parents with children.
7
                                                 
3 Most of the analysis of the Negative Income Tax (NIT) experiments carried out in the 1960s and 1970s focused on 
the labor supply effects, but some studies did examine the impacts on education. However, the emphasis in these 
studies was on the impact of a NIT on the work-school choices of youths in experimental families and on scholastic 
performance of school-age children in these families. Hanushek (1986) reviews this evidence. 
4 Conditioning benefits on full-time employment also minimizes reductions in labor supply such as those that would 
occur under a conventional NIT. 
5 Indeed, Robins and Michalopoulos (2001) base their simulations of the consequences of adopting this approach in 
the U.S. on results from the SSP. 
6 Long-term was defined as having been on welfare for at least 12 of the past 13 months. For details of the SSP 
demonstration see Michalopoulos et. al (2002). 
7 In Canada welfare (often referred to as income or social assistance) is not restricted to single parents with children. 
  Among those who agreed to   7 
participate, one-half were randomly assigned to the treatment group that was eligible for the 
earnings supplement; the rest were assigned to the control group. Those in the treatment group 
were offered a financial incentive to leave welfare and take up full-time employment.
8 The 
financial incentive was generous, approximately doubling income from work for the typical 
participant and providing total income substantially higher than welfare benefits.
9
The experimental findings are summarized in the SSP Final Report (Michalopoulos et. al. 
2002). More than one-third of the treatment group obtained full-time employment and qualified 
for the earnings supplement. During the SSP eligibility period, the treatment group experienced 
substantial gains in earnings and employment and reduced welfare use relative to the control 
group. The largest impacts – differences in employment rates and welfare receipt of 
approximately 14 percentage points -- were observed during the first 12-15 months following 
random assignment. After this time the differences in outcomes between the treatment and 
  
The SSP demonstration incorporated two important time limits. Members of the treatment 
group were given up to 12 months following random assignment to obtain full-time employment. 
Once they had qualified, participants could continue to receive the supplement for three years 
providing they maintained full-time employment. Those in the control group could remain on 
welfare or enter the workforce. Card and Hyslop (2005) show that the two SSP time limits 
generated an “establishment” incentive to find a full-time job and exit welfare within 12 months 
after random assignment, and an “entitlement” incentive to choose work over welfare once 
eligibility was established. Accordingly we look for differences in educational activity during the 
first year after random assignment and during the subsequent three years.   
                                                 
8 Full-time employment was defined as at least 30 hours per week and could be achieved by combining two or more 
part-time jobs. 
9 Blank, Card and Robins (2000) review seven financial incentive welfare-to-work programs evaluated by random 
assignment in the U.S. and Canada during the 1990s. The SSP earnings supplement was the most generous of this 
group.   8 
control groups narrowed.
10 By the end of the 3-year period of supplement eligibility treatment-
control differences in employment, earnings and welfare receipt were small.
11
However, there were important differences in behavior between the two provinces, a feature 
of the experiment that has not previously been adequately explained. Treatment – control 
differences in employment and welfare use persisted much longer in New Brunswick than in 
British Columbia.
   
12
In this section we outline a simple economic model that motivates the empirical analysis and 
helps to interpret the results. The model has several key features. First, as in Keane and Wolpin 
(2002), welfare recipients are forward looking; decisions made today may affect opportunities 
and constraints in the future. Second, reflecting the fact that all of those in the experimental 
sample volunteered to participate in the SSP, recipients are potentially interested in achieving 
self-sufficiency. One way to do so – the method emphasized in previous analysis of the SSP -- is 
to enter the labor force and accumulate work experience that may raise future earnings. The 
 We discuss these provincial differences, and provide an explanation for 
them, later in the paper.   
A noteworthy feature of the SSP design was that it generated large differences in full-time 
employment rates between the treatment and control groups, especially during the first 12 to 15 
months after random assignment. Compared to other welfare-to-work programs that provide a 
financial incentive to exit welfare, the SSP provides a unique setting for examining the 
consequences for educational attainment of emphasizing full-time work.   
3. Model 
                                                 
10 See Michalopoulos et. al (2002), Figures 3.1 and 3.2. 
11 At the 52-month point the employment rates of the two groups were approximately equal and not significantly 
different from each other (Michalopoulos et. al. (2002). The fraction receiving welfare converged by month 70 
(Card and Hyslop, 2005).   
12 For example, in the second quarter of year 5 the employment difference was -2.0 (with a standard error of 1.7) in  
BC versus +5.4 (standard error = 1.8) in NB (Michalopoulos et. al. (2002).   9 
alternative is to acquire additional formal education, which may also increase earnings potential. 
Although the potential benefits of investing in education have been considered in other dynamic 
contexts (e.g. Keane and Wolpin, 2000), they have not previously been considered in analyzing 
the SSP, nor have they received much attention in the broader welfare-to-work literature.  
A third feature is recognition of the time constraint. Upgrading one’s education or working 
full-time reduces time available for caring for children and other household production. The final 
key characteristic of the model is the presence of heterogeneity in preferences and constraints.  
Some welfare recipients are more “job ready” than others, due to such factors as more education 
and/or work experience and better language or other skills. They thus face lower costs of 
obtaining full-time employment and higher potential wages. Likewise, some individuals would 
find it more costly to complete an educational program because doing so would require 
completing more courses or involve greater psychic costs associated with additional schooling.  
We first outline the model that applies to those not eligible for the earnings supplement, i.e. 
those in the SSP control group. The model has three periods. In period 0 each single parent is on 
income assistance (welfare) receiving benefits bi. In period 1 each recipient can choose one of 
three mutually exclusive options: (i) enter the labor force and search for full-time employment, 
(ii) enter an educational program such as one leading to a high school diploma or university 
degree, and (iii) remain on income assistance without undertaking option (i) or (ii). Those who 
select the first option are denoted by JSi = 1, and those selecting option 2 by EUi = 1. Those with 
JSi = 0 and EUi = 0 remain on welfare or income assistance (IAi = 1) receiving welfare benefit bi.  
For those choosing to enter the labor force there is a cost of searching for work CSi that 
varies across individuals depending on their “job readiness.” Those who incur this cost receive a 
wage offer Wi drawn from a distribution of wage offers. In the base period each single parent   10 
knows CSi and the distribution of wage offers that Wi would be drawn from. Not all those who 
choose to search for full-time employment (and thus incur search costs CSi) receive a wage offer 
high enough to accept the offered job. Among those who accept the offer, wages evolve 
according to  
      W2i  =  ki  W1i     (1) 
where ki is the return to work experience for individual i. Those who do not accept the wage 
offer remain on welfare, receiving benefit bi.     
Single parents that return to school incur schooling costs CEi. These individuals continue 
to receive welfare benefits bi in period 1, but have less time available for childcare and 
household production than their counterparts who do not return to school. In period 2 they enter 
the workforce and obtain employment at wage  
      W2i  =  si  W1i         (2) 
where si is the return to schooling and W1i is the wage offer that individual i would have received 
if she had entered the labor force in period 1.      
The optimizing choices for each recipient are obtained by backward induction. There are 
numerous sources of heterogeneity in the model: search costs CSi, wage offers conditional on job 
search Wi, returns to work experience ki, costs of obtaining additional education CEi, and returns 
to additional education si. For illustrative purposes we focus on two sources of heterogeneity: 
costs of obtaining an offer of full-time employment CSi and costs of obtaining additional 
education CEi. The distributions of these costs produce four groups of welfare recipients: 
1) those for whom CSi and CEi are sufficiently large that they choose IAi = 1; 
2) those who choose JSi = 1 but receive a wage offer sufficiently low that they remain on welfare 
(IAi = 1);   11 
3) those who choose JSi = 1 and accept the wage offer, receiving the wage W1i in period 1 and 
W2i in period 2; 
4) those who choose EUi = 1, receiving income bi in period 1 and the wage W2i in period 2. 
  The model predicts cut-off values that separate recipients into these groups.
13
  However, the offer of an earnings supplement also alters the choice between searching 
for work and acquiring additional education. Those who enter the labor force directly in period 1 
receive the earnings supplement in periods 1 and 2, while those who enter the labor force in 
period 2 after acquiring additional schooling receive the earnings supplement only in period 2. 
The supplement offer is predicted to reduce the number of individuals acquiring additional 
 Denote the 
cut-off values CSi* and CEi* that yield groups of size N1* in groups 1 and 2, N2* in group 3 and 
N3* in group 4. The behavior of the SSP control group provides unbiased estimates of the 
number of single parents in each of these three groups. Denote these estimates by N1*, N2* and 
N3*. 
  Now consider those randomly assigned to the SSP treatment group. Because of random 
assignment, the group sizes N1*, N2* and N3* are unbiased estimates of the outcomes that 
would be observed for the treatment group in the absence of the SSP supplement offer.     
  The offer of an earnings supplement alters the incentives that single parents face by 
enhancing the income associated with full-time employment. The comparative static predictions 
of the supplement offer are unambiguous. Those who choose to search for work (JSi = 1) and 
accept the wage offer now receive income W1i + ES (W1i) in period 1 and W2i + ES (W2i) in 
period 2. This lowers the cut-off value of CSi, and reduces the size of group 1 to N1** < N1* 
and increases the size of group 2 to N2** > N2*. This is the familiar predicted impact of the 
offer of an earnings supplement analyzed in previous studies. 
                                                 
13 Details of the cut-off values and comparative statics predictions are available on request.   12 
schooling (N3** < N3*) and to increase the number of recipients directly entering the labor 
force. The comparative statics predictions N2** > N2* and N3** < N3* are tested in section 5. 
4.  Data 
Participants in the SSP demonstration were surveyed at the baseline, and after 18, 36 and 54 
months. In addition, monthly administrative data on welfare receipt and employment is available. 
The full data set consists of 5978 observations. We exclude the 293 individuals in the SSP+ 
program, which involved a different treatment.
14 We also exclude the 833 individuals who did 
not respond to the 54 month survey since we have no educational attainment and enrolment data 
post 36 months for such persons. 
15 
16
The surveys contain two principal sources of information that can be used to characterise 
education upgrading. One source utilizes the enrolment and educational attainment questions. 
Each survey asks whether the individual: a) graduated from high school; b) was ever enrolled in 
a community college or trade school, and if so whether they obtained a certificate or diploma 
from that schooling; and c) was ever enrolled in a university, and if so whether they obtained a 
university certificate, diploma or degree.
  Additional information on education upgrading is 
provided by the course work questions, available from the 18 through 54-month surveys. These 
questions ask respondents whether they have taken any work or non-work related courses since 
the previous survey. Individuals who respond positively are then asked whether these courses 
were work-related or non-work (education) related. The education questions were either identical 
or very similar across all four surveys.  
 Our final sample thus consists of 4852 individuals. 
                                                 
14 SSP Plus was a variant designed to test the combination of the SSP financial incentive and additional services 
such as resume writing, job clubs and employment counseling. 
15 A regression of a SSP treatment dummy on a dummy equal to one for not responding to the 54 month survey 
reveals that there was no statistically significant difference between treatments and controls in survey non-response 
after 36 months. 
16 We have, however, examined the experimental effect of the SSP on educational attainment including individuals 
who missed the 54-month survey, using the methods outlined in the appendix for dealing with missing data. The 
results are unchanged and are available upon request.    13 
Appendix Table A1 shows all possible combinations of responses to the high-school 
completion question over time and the number of responses for each combination. Some 
responses to the high school completion question are not consistent with the fact that educational 
attainment can increase but cannot decrease over time. In addition, not all participants responded 
to each of the four surveys. We deal with measurement error and missing data in several ways, as 
described in the appendix. The results are not sensitive to these alternative sample restrictions. In 
what follows we present findings based on our preferred sample; results based on alternative 
samples are reported in the appendix. 
5.  The experimental impact of the SSP supplement offer on educational attainment 
We now examine whether there were differences between the treatment and control groups in 
acquiring additional schooling during the 54 months of the SSP demonstration. Consistent with 
the emphasis on heterogeneity in our theoretical model, we analyse educational upgrading for 
two distinct groups – those who had and had not completed high school at the baseline. Because 
these sub-samples of “potential upgraders” condition on a baseline characteristic, each sub-
sample should be as good as randomly assigned to the treatment and control groups. Table 1 
reports mean baseline characteristics for these sub-samples. Most are unmarried mothers, with 
average age of 32 years. More than one-half of the full sample had not completed high school at 
the baseline. These single parents spent almost all of the previous year on welfare, as was 
required for participation in the SSP demonstration. Nonetheless, they have considerable 
previous work experience, with dropouts reporting over 6 years and high school graduates over 8 
years of experience. Other differences between the two sub-samples (which are generally modest 
in nature) are evident in the number of children (higher among dropouts), whether ever married   14 
(less likely among dropouts), immigrant status (graduates are more likely to have been born 
outside Canada) and disability status (dropouts are more likely to report being disabled). 
The baseline survey also included questions about attitudes towards work and welfare. Over 
60% of both groups agreed or strongly agreed with the statement “I am ashamed to admit to 
people that I am on welfare” and about 70% agreed/strongly agreed with the statement “Its 
wrong to stay on welfare if you can get a job, even a job you don’t like.” The most noteworthy 
difference between dropouts and graduates in responses to these attitudinal questions related to 
the desire for additional schooling. Those who had not completed high school were much more 
likely to agree/strongly agree with the statement “Right now I’d really like to be going to school 
to improve my reading and math skills.”  
Consistent with the dropouts and graduates sub-samples being as good as randomly assigned, 
none of the mean characteristics is significantly different between the program and control 
groups. As an additional test of random assignment, we also conducted Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
tests on the equality of the distribution functions of the continuous variables. In each case, we 
were unable to reject the null hypothesis of equality of the distribution functions. 
The top panel of Table 2 shows the evolution of high school completion using our preferred 
high school dropout sample of 2693 individuals.
17
                                                 
17 In both provinces there are three ways adults may obtain a high school diploma. The first is to go back to a high 
school classroom setting and complete the regular secondary school curriculum. Very few adults receive their 
diploma in this manner. The second, and by far most popular, route is the adult high school diploma program known 
as Adult Dogwood in British Columbia and Adult High-School Diploma in New Brunswick. These programs are 
only for individuals age 19+ and are offered through the community college system. The major difference between 
the two provinces is that eligibility for the NB program is more stringent. The final route to a high school diploma is 
to challenge the exams. In NB this would involve writing the exam for the required courses and achieving 60% or 
more. In BC, at the time of the SSP, there were required provincial exams and thus students would have to challenge 
those as well as meet other graduation requirements. In both provinces there is no tuition for the adult high school 
diploma programs.  
 There is evidence of a substantial amount of 
educational change during the period. In each interval, members of the control group exhibited a 
greater increase in high school completion than their counterparts in the treatment group. By the   15 
end of the SSP, high school completion increased by 20.9 percentage points in the control group 
versus 16.8 percentage points in the treatment group, a differential of 4.1 percentage points. 
Appendix Table A2 reveals that the methods used to address measurement error and missing data 
do not significantly influence the results with the experimental effect ranging from 3.9 to 4.2 
percentage points for high school completion. By this measure, the extent of educational 
upgrading in the treatment group is around 25-35% below that of the control group, a differential 
that is large in a behavioral sense and statistically significant. 
The final column of Table 2 reports differences estimators that include a full set of baseline 
control variables in a high school upgrading regression. Under random assignment both the 
simple differences estimators in column 3 and the regression-controlled differences estimator in 
column 4 provide unbiased estimates of the impact of the SSP financial incentive on educational 
change. Comparison of these two estimators provides a further test of random assignment. As 
can be seen, the simple and regression-controlled differences estimates are virtually identical, 
providing further evidence that random assignment was preserved for our sub-sample of high 
school dropouts. 
The timing of educational change is also noteworthy. The largest treatment – control 
differences in courses taken (not shown) occur in the first 18-month interval, when the difference 
in work activity between the two groups was greatest. In addition, the smallest gap in course 
work activity is evident in the final 18-month interval, when the employment rates of the 
treatment and control groups had substantially converged. 
The bottom panel of Table 2 presents a similar analysis for enrolment in university.
18 
19
                                                 
18 The number of observations on university completion is too small to warrant analysis. 
 
Compared to their counterparts in the program group, control group members were more likely   16 
to enrol in university programs, with a statistically significant difference of 1.8 percentage 
points. Even at the university level the difference in educational activity between treatments and 
controls is non-trivial in size and statistically significant. 
There were also noteworthy differences between the two provinces in the impact of the 
financial offer on educational upgrading. Table 3 shows the provincial breakdowns. In both 
jurisdictions, and for both dropouts and graduates, the control group invests more in additional 
education than does the treatment group. However, the experimental impact is much larger in BC 
than in NB. Among those who were dropouts at the baseline, the treatment-control difference in 
completing secondary school is 5.7 percentage points in BC versus 2.6 percentage points in NB. 
The treatment-control gap in university enrolment is also more than double its NB counterpart. 
We explore these provincial differences further in the following section.  
In summary, measures of educational upgrading at both the high school and university levels 
indicate that SSP participants made substantial additional investments in human capital during 
the demonstration. The differences between treatments and controls also imply that the SSP 
financial incentive resulted in less acquisition of additional schooling than would otherwise have 
been the case. The differential in educational activity between the treatment and control groups is 
substantial, whether measured by enrolment or credentials obtained. The timing of the upgrading 
is consistent with the view that the emphasis on full-time work reduced human capital 
                                                                                                                                                             
19 There is also substantial educational activity at the community college and trade school levels, and significantly 
more enrolment in these courses among members of the control group. For example, the experimental impact on 
enrolment in college and trades school courses is -3.8 percentage points with a standard error of 1.5. We chose to 
focus on university enrolment for several reasons. Community colleges offer a very heterogeneous mix of courses 
and programs, including adult basic education and high school level courses as well as post-secondary programs. 
The programs also vary substantially in duration, from one-day seminars to two-year academic and vocational 
programs. Because many courses taken for the purposes of high school completion were delivered by community 
colleges, there is considerable risk of “double-counting” when using measures based on college enrolment. In 
addition these institutions offer general interest courses such as dance, theatre, bible studies, avalanche training and 
cosmology that may not constitute work-related human capital formation.  As a consequence, university enrolment 
is a cleaner measure of educational activity at the post-secondary level. There is also less evidence of measurement 
error at the university than at the college level, perhaps reflecting the heterogeneous nature of college programs.      17 
accumulation of the treatment group because of a combination of reduced time available for non-
market activities and lower incentives to acquire additional education.  
6. Education upgrading and our understanding of the SSP 
The experimental findings demonstrate that the control group invested more in formal education 
than the treatment group, particularly in British Columbia. While these results are arguably of 
primary importance for the design of welfare-to-work policies, our focus in this section is on a 
narrower question. Does this unintended consequence of the earnings supplement offer alter the 
lessons from the SSP demonstration itself? Two issues are examined. First, does the differential 
extent of educational change across provinces help us understand the different impacts of the 
earnings supplement offer in the two jurisdictions? Second, does the extra education attained by 
the control group help explain why income assistance receipt and full-time employment were so 
similar in the treatment and control groups at the end of the earnings supplement period?  
Table 4 shows income assistance rates by province as well as pooled for the SSP period. 
In the period after the expiry of the SSP supplement, substantial differences in welfare receipt 
across provinces are evident, differences that have received little previous attention.
20 In 
particular, the convergence in welfare that is often associated with the SSP is much more 
pronounced in British Columbia where income assistance receipt at the 54-month survey was 
virtually identical between program and controls for high school dropouts and roughly the same 
for graduates. For New Brunswick, however, there is a gap of 6 to 7 percentage points.
21
These differences raise an obvious question: if there had been less education upgrading 
(as was the case in NB compared to BC), would the offer of a substantial earnings supplement 
  
                                                 
20 The SSP Final Report (Michalopoulos et. al., 2002, chapter 4) notes these differences but does not offer an 
explanation. To our knowledge, no explanation has been put forward. 
21 As with all of our findings in this section, the general pattern is the same for full-time employment and so for 
brevity we leave those results to be available upon request. 
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have had a more lasting effect on full-time employment and welfare receipt? To address this 
question we analyze the impact of educational upgrading on income assistance receipt for our 
two sub-samples. Our goal is to provide a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the extent to 
which the extra educational attainment of the control group contributed to the similar welfare and 
employment patterns of the treatment and control groups after the expiry of the SSP earnings 
supplement. In estimating the effects of educational upgrading on labor market outcomes an 
obvious econometric challenge is non-random selection into education upgrading. At the outset 
we note that we do not expect that selection into upgrading is likely to be a serious issue in our 
two sub-samples, which are narrowly defined and relatively homogeneous groups. The SSP data 
contains a rich set of individual characteristics, including attitudes toward work, school and 
welfare, allowing us to control to an important extent for remaining heterogeneity within these 
groups. We deal with selection into educational upgrading based on unobserved factors by 
exploiting the longitudinal nature of the data. An additional statistical issue is measurement error 
in educational attainment, particularly changes in attainment, as documented in Appendix A. We 
address measurement error in education using an instrumental variable approach.
22
where Yit is income assistance receipt; xit is a vector of time-varying covariates which includes a 
dummy for either high school completion or enrolment in university; zi is a vector of baseline 
controls; θt is a time effect; ci is a time-invariant, individual-specific fixed effect; and νit is an 
error term that is independent of θt and ci. We estimate (3) separately for the high school dropout 
  
  We begin with a simple longitudinal model as follows: 
  Yit  =  xitβ1 + ziβ2 + β3θt + β4θt*zi + ci + νit          (3) 
                                                 
22 Our approach is similar to that of Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) who study the impact of education on earnings 
using data on identical twins. As is the case here, they face the twin problems of endogeneity of education and 
measurement error in attainment. They employ a family fixed effects specification to deal with the former and an IV 
approach for the latter.   19 
and graduate samples, as displayed in Table 1. We interact the SSP program dummy with the 
time dummies to capture the incentive effects of the earnings supplement offer on employment 
and welfare receipt of the program group. As is documented below, this works well as the 
predicted IA rates from our models are almost identical to the actual IA rates shown in Table 4. 
We assume that all covariates, including the decision to upgrade education, are strictly 
exogenous conditional on the unobserved effect ci. The assumption of selection into upgrading 
on the basis of individual-specific time-invariant effects is consistent with our theoretical model 
that emphasizes heterogeneity across individuals in the costs and benefits of additional 
education. For example, the distance to the closest community college will vary across individual 
high school dropouts but is unlikely to vary over time for a specific individual. To address 
measurement error in education we adopt an instrumental variable strategy, choosing the 
coursework variable discussed earlier as an instrument for education upgrading. Such 
measurement error would otherwise bias the estimated coefficient on educational change towards 
zero. As we have documented, the measurement error in educational upgrading is substantial, 
especially for the case of obtaining a high school diploma. Our operating assumption that the 
decision to upgrade is exogenous conditional on the unobserved effect ci remains with the IV 
approach. Under this assumption the use of the course work variable as an instrument for 
educational upgrading yields consistent estimates of the parameters in equation (3).
23
Several pieces of evidence support the assumption that upgrading is exogenous 
conditional on ci. First, if we were to test the stronger assumption that upgrading is as good as 
randomly assigned we would be interested in establishing that upgraders and non-upgraders have 
similar mean characteristics (both observed and unobserved) and that the two groups have 
 
                                                 
23 This can be seen by taking first differences of equation (3). The course work variable is uncorrelated with the 
error term in the first-differenced equation and highly correlated with the educational upgrading variable xit - xit-1.    20 
common trends in welfare receipt. Note that the common trends condition largely holds simply 
as a result of the SSP design: to qualify for the study participants must have been on welfare 11 
of the 12 months pre-baseline. On mean characteristics, appendix Table A3 reports baseline 
characteristics of the future upgraders and non-upgraders separately by province for the high 
school dropout sample. In BC, where educational upgrading was more prevalent, none of the 
baseline characteristics of upgraders and non-upgraders is significantly different at the 5% level. 
A joint test of all baseline characteristics also fails to reject the null of equality.
24 For NB, 
differences between upgraders and non-upgraders are more evident, especially in age, age of 
youngest child, marital status and disability status. However, even here the two groups are highly 
comparable in their responses to the attitudinal questions that probe (typically unobserved) 
motivational characteristics. There are no statistically significant differences in the responses of 
the two groups on attitudes toward welfare, in their desire to be going to school, and whether 
they “like to work”. In the high school graduate sample, the mean characteristics for university 
enrollees and non-enrollees are even more similar than for the dropout sample.
25
                                                 
24 We regressed the upgrading dummy on the full set of baseline characteristics, and tested their joint contribution to 
explaining upgrading. The F-statistic on the null hypothesis that all coefficients except that on the constant equals 
zero equals 1.79, which is insignificant at the 5% level.   
25 The F-statistics corresponding to the test reported in the previous footnote were 1.4 for BC and 1.3 for NB. Only 
one individual characteristic was significantly different at the 5% level. 
 
Finally, as discussed in more detail below, we also carry out a falsification test for our 
assumption about upgrading. This falsification test easily passes. Overall, it is not clear that – at 
least for these two relatively homogeneous groups – selection on unobservables into upgrading 
education is a serious issue, especially in BC. In any event, our specification deals with selection 
into upgrading on the basis of person-specific fixed effects, which seems a reasonable 
assumption in this setting.   21 
Table 5a presents the results from estimating equation (3) by fixed-effects and two-stage 
fixed-effects estimation for BC while Table 5b shows the same results for NB.
26
Table 7 presents the results of our policy simulation. These provide estimates of the 
behavior of welfare receipt through the SSP period under the counterfactual in which none of the 
dropouts – i.e., both program and control group members – completed their high school diploma. 
Similarly, we simulate welfare patterns for the high school graduate sample under the 
 For comparison 
purposes we also show pooled-cross-sectional results estimated by OLS and two-stage least 
squares. We note that the IV strategy overall appears to work reasonably well. The IV estimates 
are larger, consistent with the measurement error in the education variables. As one would 
expect, particularly in the fixed-effects case, standard errors increase substantially. Perhaps more 
interestingly, we note that the fixed-effects estimator does not appear necessary: the OLS pooled-
cross-sectional estimates are very similar to the fixed-effects estimates and similarly for the IV 
results. Consistent with the previous discussion, selection into upgrading on the basis of 
unobserved factors for these relatively homogeneous groups may not be quantitatively important. 
As a further check on the specification, we carried out a falsification test for the high 
school dropout sample. The test utilizes information on education upgrading between each 
survey pair, and examines whether single parents who subsequently upgrade were less likely to 
be on welfare prior to improving their educational attainment. The results, reported in Table 6, 
demonstrate that this pre-treatment alignment test easily passes at each post-baseline survey date. 
We find no evidence that those who later complete high school had, prior to doing so, 
unobserved characteristics that are associated with lower welfare use. 
                                                 
26 In the Table 5 estimates the only time-varying covariates are those for educational change. Adding other time-
varying covariates such as marital status doesn’t alter the results.   22 
counterfactual assumption that no one enrolled in university. Table 7(a) displays results for the 
high school dropout sample while Table 7(b) contains simulations for the sample of graduates. 
The simulations indicate both the role of human capital accumulation in explaining 
welfare patterns, but also – of more interest to us in this paper – whether there would have been 
convergence in income assistance receipt over the SSP demonstration if education attainment 
had remained the same for the program and control groups. Recall that the predicted welfare 
rates from our model are nearly identical to the actual rates as seen earlier in Table 4; this is 
largely due to our specification, which includes time dummies, a random assignment dummy, 
and (importantly) interactions between random assignment and time period (along with the other 
baseline controls).  Thus our specification incorporates all factors (such as greater income and 
work experience accumulated by the program group during the SSP demonstration) that 
influence the time pattern of welfare receipt of the program and control groups. Finally, we note 
that our simulations are based on the IV fixed-effect regression estimates, but are virtually 
identical to the simulations if we use the IV estimates from the pooled cross-sectional case as is 
obvious from the similarity of the estimates for the two estimation procedures. The one 
exception is for NB in the high school dropout sample where we find no effect of upgrading on 
welfare use in the IV fixed-effects case, but a sizeable impact in the pooled cross-section case. 
Thus, because we are using the IV fixed-effects estimates for the simulations, we find no role for 
education upgrading in the SSP for NB in the case of high school dropouts, but if we switched to 
the IV pooled-cross-sectional results the findings would be roughly similar to the NB high school 
graduate sample.  
Tables 7a and 7b illustrate the classic convergence in welfare receipt over time as seen 
earlier in the actual rates. For high school dropouts, by the 54-month point, predicted (and actual)   23 
welfare use was essentially the same for program group members as for the control group in BC, 
but not in NB where a substantial gap of 6 percentage points remains. Our simulation of what 
welfare rates would have looked like if the program and control groups had done no upgrading to 
a high school diploma reveals that the 54-month gap would have been 3 percentage points 
instead of zero in BC – at modestly higher welfare rates of about 65% for the program group 
(versus 59% with upgrading) and 68% for the control group (versus 59% with upgrading). For 
NB in the high school dropout case, the simulated and actual results are about the same. As noted 
above, this is largely due to the IV-fixed effects coefficient being very small (.027) but also 
reflects the fact that there was less upgrading in NB than in BC. When we simulate what welfare 
rates for high school graduates would have looked like if none of these individuals had enrolled 
in a university, the overall pattern is very similar with roughly an extra 3 percentage points added 
to the program-control difference in BC. For NB, in this case the welfare receipt differential 
increases by approximately 1 percentage point (from 6 to 7 points).  
Thus, overall, the general income assistance pattern of the program group tapering off 
after the peak of the “incentive” period (at 18 months) while the control group ‘catches up’ 
remains the same even in the absence of educational change over the SSP time period.  However, 
our estimates suggest that in BC a gap of about 3 percentage points would have existed by the 
54-month point if the program group had not been less likely to upgrade their education. There 
already was a non-trivial gap at the end of the supplement period in NB. These simulation results 
-- a gap of about 6-7 percentage points in one province and 3 percentage points in the other -- 
province are more suggestive of a small “permanent” effect of the SSP supplement offer than are 
the experimental estimates, which are influenced by the unintended impact of reduced 
educational attainment gains in the program group. Whether these modest impacts would persist   24 
beyond the 54-month point is, of course, an open question.
27
                                                 
27 We know from the income assistance records that there was some, albeit small, further convergence in New 
Brunswick between 54 months and 72 months where the administrative data ends (e.g., see Card and Hyslop 2005). 
But, we unfortunately cannot know what happened to education after the 54-month point, the last survey. 
 Further, there may be long-run 
benefits to generating self-sustaining careers – from university enrolment in particular – that 
cannot be measured with the SSP time period. Another caveat is that over time more complex 
work patterns may have emerged.  
The simulation results also provide some insight into the large gap between BC and NB 
in the experimental estimates of the impact of the supplement offer on welfare use. About one-
half of the difference in welfare receipt (approximately 6 percentage points) between the two 
provinces is attributed by our estimates to the more substantial advances in education in BC than 
in NB. The results also suggest that education upgrading among long-term welfare recipients 
plays a reasonably important role in explaining the likelihood of exiting from welfare.  
7.  Conclusions 
This paper examines the extent and nature of educational upgrading among participants in 
the Self-Sufficiency Project. At the outset of the project, all participants were single parents who 
had been long-term welfare recipients. The paper also investigates the consequences of increases 
in educational attainment for their propensity to remain on welfare. 
There are three principal findings. First, there is a substantial amount of educational 
upgrading in this population. At the baseline, more than one-half of SSP participants had not 
completed secondary school. About 19 percent of those who were high school dropouts at the 
baseline had completed secondary school by the end of the period. There was also substantial 
activity at the post-secondary level in the form of enrolment in a community college or 
university.     25 
Second, we find that individuals randomly assigned to the SSP treatment group acquired less 
additional education during the period than did their counterparts in the control group. The lower 
levels of human capital acquisition observed in the treatment group are evident at both the 
secondary school (high school completion) and post-secondary (enrolment in university) levels. 
Our explanation for this result is that the SSP earnings supplement encouraged treatment group 
members to exit welfare and take up full-time employment, thus providing less time for other 
activities, including acquiring additional education. Consistent with this hypothesis, the 
difference in courses taken between treatments and controls is greatest during the early part of 
the SSP demonstration when the gap in full-time employment between the two groups was 
largest. This difference narrows as the differential in employment rates diminishes. In addition to 
reducing the time available for non-market activities, the financial incentive increased the 
income that could be earned with existing skills and reduced the return to acquiring additional 
education. 
These findings have potentially important implications for welfare-to-work policies that 
emphasize a work-first approach. Our results suggest that providing incentives to leave welfare 
and take up full-time employment may have adverse side effects on human capital acquisition --
consequences that need to be weighed against any positive benefits of such policies. 
Finally, we provide estimates of the impact of educational upgrading on the incidence of 
welfare use, and use these estimates to simulate the time paths of welfare receipt in the program 
and control groups in the absence of advances in educational attainment. Our estimates control 
for a rich set of observed characteristics as well as unobserved person-specific fixed effects. We 
also deal with measurement error in educational change using course work completed as an 
instrumental variable. The IV – FE estimates imply that educational upgrading reduces reliance   26 
on welfare. Our simulations provide insight into two features of the SSP experimental estimates. 
One is the apparent absence of a lasting effect of the earnings supplement offer on welfare use, 
despite large differences between the program and control groups in work activity and income 
during the supplement period. The simulations suggest that, in the absence of the unintended 
reduction in educational upgrading in the program group, the SSP financial offer would have 
reduced welfare use at the end of the supplement period by 3 to 6 percentage points. In addition, 
the simulations help us to understand the previously unexplained large gap between BC and NB 
in the estimated experimental impacts. About one-half of the gap appears to be due to the greater 
prevalence of educational improvement among SSP participants in BC compared to NB.          27 
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Table 1 
Baseline summary statistics by high school completion status 
Variable  Dropouts at baseline  Graduates at baseline 
















































































































































Wrong to stay on 










Number of observations  1350  1343  1110  1049 
 
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses. The “Dropouts at baseline” sample consists of all individuals who were 
high school dropouts at the baseline. The “Graduates at baseline” sample consists of all individuals who were high 
school graduates at the baseline. 
1.  Agree or strongly agree with the statement “I like going to work” 
2.  Agree or strongly agree with the statement “Right now I’d really like to be going to school to improve my 
reading and math skills” 
3.  Agree or strongly agree with the statement “I am ashamed to admit to people that I am on welfare” 
4.  Agree or strongly agree with the statement “It’s wrong to stay on welfare if you can get a job, even a job 
you don’t like”   29 
Table 2 
Education upgrading in the Self-Sufficiency Project 
Education type 
 
Treatment group  Control group  Difference  Difference – with 
baseline controls 






































(b) Enrolled in a university (N=2159) 
Baseline 
 
































NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample in panel (a) consists of all individuals who were high school 
dropouts at the baseline. The sample in panel (b) consists of all individuals who were high school graduates at the 
baseline.Table 3 
Educational upgrading by province 
 
  High school dropouts obtaining high school diploma 
  British Columbia (N=1438)  New Brunswick (N=1255) 
  Program  Control  Difference  Program  Control  Difference 
Baseline 
 











































  High school graduates enrolling in university 
  British Columbia (N=1100)  New Brunswick (N=1059) 
  Program  Control  Difference  Program  Control  Difference 
Baseline 
 











































Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.   31 
Table 4 
Income assistance rates by high school completion status and province 
 
  High school dropout sample 
 
  Pooled  British Columbia  New Brunswick 

























































N  1350  1343  720  718  630  625 
  High school graduate sample 
 

























































N  1110  1049  574  526  536  523   32 
Table 5 (a) 
Estimated coefficients of the change in probability of receiving income assistance: British Columbia 
 
  High School Dropouts  High School Graduates 
  OLS  IV  Fixed-effects  IV Fixed-
effects 












 -   -  -  - 
Enrolled in 
university 










Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Time dummies 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
SSP * time 
dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R squared 
 
 .12   .12   .14   .10   .18   .07   .18   .09 
First stage F-
statistic 
-  71.6  -  106.6  -  40.6  -  85.5 
Number of 
observations 
5752  5525  5752  5525  4400  4268  4400  4268 
Number of 
individuals 
1438  1438  1438  1438  1100  1100  1100  1100 
 
NOTES: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.   33 
Table 5 (b) 
Estimated coefficients of the change in probability of receiving income assistance: New Brunswick 
 
  High School Dropouts  High School Graduates 
  OLS  IV  Fixed-effects  IV Fixed-
effects 












 -  -   -  - 
Enrolled in 
university 










Yes  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes  No  No 
Time dummies 
 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
SSP * time 
dummies 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
First stage F-
statistic 
-  80.1  -  84.5  -  67.1  -  102.2 
R-squared 
 
.11  .10  .11  .10  .24  .23  .24  .23 
Number of 
observations 
5020  4903  5020  4903  4236  4173  4236  4173 
Number of 
individuals 
1255  1255  1255  1255  1059  1059  1059  1059 
 
NOTES: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%.    34 
Table 6  Falsification test 
Treatment 
sample: 
OLS estimated coefficients for effect of high school completion 
on future welfare use: By upgrading cohort 
 
  On welfare at 18 
months 
On welfare at 36 
months 























-  -  -.105*** 
(.038) 
  Pre-treatment alignment tests: OLS estimated coefficients for 




On welfare at 
baseline 
On welfare at 18 
months 




18 months  
-.000 
(.005) 
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Table 7(a) 
Simulations of income assistance receipt under no high school upgrading: By province 
 
Time  British Columbia  New Brunswick 
  Predicted  Simulated with no upgrading  Predicted  Simulation with no upgrading 













































































Simulations of income assistance receipt under no university enrolment: By province 
 
Time  British Columbia  New Brunswick 
  Predicted  Simulated with no upgrading  Predicted  Simulation with no upgrading 
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Appendix  
Measurement error 
We first document the extent of measurement error in the educational attainment 
questions, and our approach to addressing this error. To preview the results of this exercise, we 
emphasize that the results are highly robust to different choices, despite non-trivial differences in 
sample size across the samples associated with these choices.  
Table A1 shows all combinations of responses to the high school graduation questions. 
The responses are divided into two main groups, referred to as "consistent responses" and 
"inconsistent responses." Consistency here refers to responses that accord with the fact that 
educational attainment can increase but cannot decrease over time. For example, we label as 
"inconsistent" someone who stated at the baseline survey that they had graduated from high 
school but who responded to a later survey that they had not completed high school. The 
consistent responses are further broken down into "No upgrading" and "Upgrading" categories. 
Inconsistent responses are also separated into two sub-groups. "Majority cases” are those in 
which one survey response differs from the responses to the other three surveys. In these 
circumstances the single outlier may be a coding error or response error. "Non-majority cases” 
are those for which the responses are evenly divided between Yes and No in a manner that is not 
logically consistent. Finally, we show at the bottom those cases where there was either a missing 
response to the high school question or where an individual dropped out for a survey. In almost 
all of these cases the individual did not respond to the entire survey (as opposed to not 
responding to the education question). For brevity we leave out the full set of permutations for 
the missing cases, but ultimately we use this data in our analysis. 
       In the case of high school, about 8% of the total sample report in at least one of the 
surveys that their education declined. However, most of these involve cases where three of the 
four surveys match up. One way to address this error would be to drop from the sample 
individuals with inconsistent responses. Although this approach has some appeal, we cannot 
presume that all of the consistent responses are measured without error. Perhaps more 
importantly, a quick review of Table A1 reveals that if you drop inconsistent cases you 
mechanically increase the extent of upgrading.  
       Our approach in creating the main sample for analysis (i.e., the samples used in Table 2 
of the paper) is to assume that the individual misreported cases where one response was   37 
inconsistent with the rest. For example, from Table A1 row 6, we assume that the ‘Yes’ reported 
at the baseline is a mistake and should be a ‘No’. This exercise therefore converts rows 6, 10, 
and 11 to counterfactual potential upgraders while rows 7, 8, and 9 are assumed to be high 
school graduates and are thus excluded from our high school analysis. For non-majority cases, it 
is unclear what decision rule to adopt. Rather than dropping these observations for our main 
sample used in the analysis, we simply assume the baseline is correct. For our sensitivity checks 
below, we also do the analysis excluding these cases (i.e., rows 12-14 are considered high school 
graduates, and thus not used in the high school analysis while rows 15 and 16 are considered 
potential upgraders with row 15 being a counterfactual case, and row 16 being classified as an 
upgrader).  
We perform this same exercise for cases where an individual missed a survey. For the 
missing surveys, this does not end up being all that important – 543 of the 581 individuals who 
missed one survey had all other education responses consistent with each other (e.g., [0, missing, 
0, 0] and so forth).  
We must make some assumptions about the timing of upgrading for those individuals 
missing responses (or surveys). For instance, in an upgrading case of [0, missing, 1, 1] we must 
make an assumption about whether the individual upgraded at 18 months or at 36 months. For 
our main upgrading variable (which equals one if the individual completed high school at some 
point) this is irrelevant, but we also do some analysis that exploits the timing of the upgrading. 
Fortunately, there are only 11 of such cases in the case of high school completion. As a decision 
rule, we always assume the upgrading occurs later (i.e., in the example above the missing is a 
zero and the individual is assumed to upgrade at 36 months). 
Finally, we conduct our analysis across all four possible techniques of addressing the 
measurement error: a) using only non-missing consistent responses, b) using only non-missing 
consistent responses plus majority inconsistent responses, c) using all non-missing responses, 
and d) our principal sample of using all data. Table A2 shows the sensitivity of the high school 
experimental impacts to these alternative choices. The experimental impact ranges from -3.9 to  
-4.2 percentage points (-4.1 for our preferred sample).  
  We omit the university results here, but there was very little evidence of measurement 
error in the case of enrolment in university. 
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Appendix Table A1 
Responses to high school attainment question over SSP (N=4852) 
 
Possible survey responses 




No upgrading cases 
1.  No  No  No  No  1688 
2.  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  1813  
Total  3501 
Upgrading cases 
3.  No  No  No  Yes  155  
4.  No  No  Yes  Yes  113  
5.  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  168  





6.  Yes  No  No  No    34 
7.  Yes  Yes  Yes  No    31 
8.  Yes  Yes  No  Yes    35 
9.  Yes  No  Yes  Yes    56 
10.  No  No  Yes  No    65 
11.  No  Yes  No  No    44 
Total  265 
Non-majority cases 
12.  Yes  Yes  No  No  12 
13.  Yes  No  Yes  No  10 
14.  Yes  No  No  Yes  17 
15.  No  Yes  Yes  No  15 
16.  No  Yes  No  Yes  15 




17.  Missing one response or survey – consistent cases  482 
18.  Missing two responses or surveys –consistent cases    61 
19.  Missing one response or survey – inconsistent cases    37 
20.  Missing two responses or surveys – inconsistent cases      2 
21.  Missing three or four responses or surveys      0 
Total  581 
 
NOTES: The complete SSP data consists of 5978 observations. SSP+ individuals (293 observations) and individuals 
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Appendix Table A2 




Treatment group  Control group  Difference 
 








































































































































NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses.  
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Appendix Table A3 
Mean baseline characteristics for high school dropout sample 
  British Columbia  New Brunswick 




















































































































































Number of observations  1123  315  1063  192 
 
NOTES: Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 